Le Front roumain de Mai a Septembre 1917
Un rapport du colonel F. Le J. Parker,
observateur américain auprès des armées roumaines
La situation sur le Front oriental a été suivie attentivement par le War Department de Washington depuis le commencement de la Grande Guerre. Immédiatement après l’entrée de la Roumanie dans la guerre le colonel F. Le J. Parker, avec des autres officiers américains, fut envoyé comme observateur auprès l’armée roumaine.
Nous présentons à nos internautes des extraits des rapports du colonel Parker, qui nous ont été communiqués par l’amabilité des réalisateurs du volume de documents
România în Marele Război. Anul 1917, MM. Colonel (ret.) dr. Petre Otu, dr. Alexandru Madgearu et Mme. Cerasela Moldoveanu, volume en préparation à l’Institut d’Etudes de Défense et d’Histoire Militaire. Les rapports de synthèse du colonel Parker présentent la reconstitution de l’armée roumaine après la campagne de 1916, la situation du Front roumain en Moldavie, depuis mai jusqu’à septembre 1917 et les perspectives sur la résistance roumaine dans les circonstances de l’effondrement de l’armée russe.
“War Department, War College Division,
Washington, September 29, 1917
From: Colonel F. Le J. Parker, National Army (former military observer with the Roumanian armies)
To: Chief of War College Division
Subject: Report on duty as military observer with the Roumanian armies.
[…] On May 5, reports were sent by both cablegrams and mail regarding the threatened interference by Russian troops in the internal politics in Roumania with a view to overturning the local monarchy. This situation appeared very serious for a day or two, enough as to cause military representatives at Jassy, of each of the allied nations, to call in a body upon the Russian commander (General Tscherbatscheff) with a view to evidencing their belief in the necessity for forceful action to prevent any disasters. General Tscherbatscheff accepted the visit in good part, stating frankly his recognition that a dangerous situation existed, but that he believed it could be successfully met. That evening, one of his staff officers called at the American Legation to say that the threatened information proved to be substantially correct and the danger passed after some days of great uneasiness.
Major Kerth and I were at this time daily expecting orders to leave Roumania. On May the 15 I called at General Staff Headquarters and asked for a final and definite decision as to whether or not we were to be sent immediately to the front. Finally at 6.30 PM I was informed that the King had authorized our departure and an officer reported who was to accompany us. […]
Major Kerth and I accordingly left Jassy May 21 in company with the Russian officer detailed to accompany us, and made a hurried trip to portions of the Russian 4
th and 9
th Armies, returning to Jassy on May 23. […]
Kerth and I visited Roumanian second army of six divisions holding front about 22 miles between Oituz and Putna Rivers including 82 infantry battalions, about 350 machine guns, 216 field guns, about 120 heavy artillery of all kinds. Estimate effective strength infantry about 40.000, cavalry 1000, artillery 12000. Total strength Second Army probably of two to three times as large as estimated effective strength. Position well intrenched, morale good, health is fairly good and improving, equipment fair clothing and shoes poor. Horses for artillery and transport very deficient in number and bad condition, total rounds of field artillery ammunition in country about 1000 per piece. Enemy in front Second Army believed outnumbered about 3 to one. Strongly intrenched, well supplied with artillery. Believe Second Army could force back temporarily enemy in its front but offensive no value without Russian cooperation. No sustained offensive by Roumanian army possible without better transportation.
May 18
th to May 21
st I made hurried visit to two cavalry divisions west of Botosani training varies very good to fair but about one half of troops dismounted. No immediate prospects obtaining suitable remounts. Principal other Roumanian force is first Army of 9 divisions reorganizing and training in rear. Full information regarding some not yet available but it is well known that typhus fever epidemic caused very heavy losses and interfered with training. Transport hopelessly deficient. Roumanian staff assert total strength first army is about 250 thousand but believe not one third of that army represents at present force effectively trained and equipped for field service and transport deficient even for that portion.
May 25 Kerth an I returned from hurried visit to portions of Russian fourth and ninth armies, Yates from fourth and sixth armies Roumanian front. Material conditions of troops and trenches generally satisfactory but there is no sign of offensive spirit and marked evidences relaxation discipline. Officers appear uncertain and discouraged in regard to future. Total Russian force Roumania probably at least half million, approximately double strength of enemy on that front. Active efforts made recently by enemy on Roumanian front open direct negotiations Russian soldiers. The attitude of latter toward continuance of war uncertain when we left. Believed to be serious agitation among them to abandon war and that passive defensive probably is the best reasonably be expected there for the present. Spirit Roumanian troops appears much better but they wholly unable face enemy alone.
Kerth and I arrived Petrograd June 2 and reported for duty June 3. Forward all mail till further notice to Petrograd General Scott here. Parker, Petrograd June 21/14.”
“War Department, War College Division,
Washington, September 29, 1917
From: Colonel F. Le J. Parker, National Army (former military observer with the Romanian armies)
To: Chief of War College Division
Subject: Impressions and recommendations regarding present conditions of Roumanian Army
1. At the time of the entrance of Roumania into the European war, it was intended that the Roumanian army should be expanded to include 23 divisions of infantry and 2 divisions of cavalry. Difficulty was experienced in completing the organization and equipment of the full 23 infantry divisions, and the number was soon reduced. By the end of December 1916, as a result of the succession of serious defeats received, the Roumanian army was in a condition of great demoralization. About the 1
st of January 1917, there arrived in Roumania a large increase of officers for duty with the French Military Mission. These officers were promptly assigned by General Berthelot, Chief of the French Military Mission, to duty in connection with the reorganization and regeneration of the Roumanian army and at one began their work. They were exceedingly successful in their efforts. By spring, the Roumanian army, now reduced to 15 divisions, was beginning to show very decided effects of improved conditions and methods of training. This improvement was made in spite of very great difficulties incident to lack of supplies and materials of all kinds, including food, fuel and clothing; and notwithstanding very serious epidemics which had spread among the troops, the most serious being typhus fever.
2. At this period the Roumanian forces consisted of the Second Army of 6 divisions, holding a portion of the combined Russian and Roumanian front, and the First Roumanian Army, reorganizing in rear. This condition continued in substance until just before the attempted combined Russian and Roumanian offensive of the past summer. The fighting from the crystallization of the Roumanian front, about the beginning of 1917, to the operations in the summer of 1917, just referred to, were of a minor character.
3. At the time of the visit to Jassy of General Scott and certain members of the United States diplomatic mission to Russia, the first Roumanian Army was being brought up from its positions in rear, and concentrated with a view to joining in the proposed offensive. […]
The Roumanian offensive was begun in a creditable manner and with some local successes, but unfortunately it was rendered wholly abortive by the disaster which just at that moment overtook the Russian Army in Bukovina and Southwestern Galicia. It also appears that the Russian troops more immediately connected with the Roumanian armies failed to support the latter in the attempted offensive.
Shortly following the cessation of any attempt of the Roumanian forces to advance, the German offensive, previously confined to portions of the front further north, were extended to include an attack against the allied front in Roumania, the two special points of attack being in the neighborhood of Focshani and the Oituz Pass. In meeting this hostile offensive, the Roumanian troops showed that the improvement in their morale, training and equipment had been substantial. They put up an excellent resistance and it appears undoubtedly due to their efforts, that the Germans are not today in full possession of all of Roumania and probably portions of Southeastern Russia. The Roumanian losses in these operations were heavy, but as far as I can learn, were replaced in substance from the incompletely equipped divisions […].
Immediately prior to my departure from Russian General Headquarters, on August the 30
th, I had a long talk with General Coanda, the Roumanian representative at those Headquarters. […]Only 11 of the 15 divisions, composing the total forces, were sufficiently equipped to be used as organized units, the personnel of all the remaining four divisions being used practically as feeders and having been, to a considerable extent, absorbed in replacing losses. General Coanda stated that there were then available for effective field service, and actually on the front, 11 infantry divisions, each with from 10.000 to 12.000 bayonets (18 battalions) and a total effective of about 200.000. The General estimated the total effective of the army (equipped) at about 250.000 men.
The Roumanian forces have done good work for the Allies under exceedingly trying conditions. The officers, although not first-class, have markedly improved under the training they have received during the last six months. The soldiers have shown themselves to possess not only resisting qualities of a high order, but the intelligence to keep their discipline and cohesion, although surrounded by several times their numbers of disorganized Russian revolutionists. If this Roumanian force is to retain any effectiveness and be able to maintain itself as an organized unit throughout the coming winter, it must be given very material outside assistance in funds, supplies of a general nature, and military equipment. Supplies can, of course, be furnished from the outside only by way of Russia. The situation in Russia shows clearly that Roumania can not depend upon the initiative of Russia alone to supply even her most vital needs.
Unless the United States intends to resign itself to seeing Roumania practically detached in her present helpless position, immediate steps must be taken for substantial and practical assistance. Conference, advice and information will not fill the bill. Food first of all, clothing next, assurance of a fuel supply, and the furnishing of necessary military equipment, are vital requirements.
As a means to bringing about the desired end, the following recommendations are submitted:
a- That a specific officer, or group of officers, be designated, whose primary duty shall be to obtain and present promptly Roumania’s needs, and to take all possible action towards securing the prompt filling of the same. With the pressing duties falling upon the different departments of the Government in the emergency of war, it is believed to be quite certain that no officer, or group, with general duties to perform, will be able to give the necessary detailed attention to learning and pressing Roumania’s needs.
b- The initiation of steps for financing the more urgent needs of the Roumanian government.
c- The initiation of steps to secure the prompt transmission, through Russia, of supplies that may be obtained for Roumania.
The carrying out of c) above is obviously a part of the Russian problem, since the organization of transportation is one of the greatest difficulties in that country. The views of the Chief of the American Military Mission in Russia should therefore be given great weight in this connection; and in general, if any prompt and effective result is to be obtained, it must be largely done through the efforts of competent men on the ground with power to act immediately within reasonable scope, and with the assurance that their recommendations in matters beyond their scope of action can be given undivided attention by some one charged with that duty.
The sending of assistance to Roumania is an obligation that rests upon us as one of the allied nations; but aside from any such moral obligation, it is believed to be obviously sound as a matter of political and military policy. It is believed that the factor which will ultimately determine what the United States sends to Europe, is the capacity of the available ship’s tonnage; and if sentimental considerations be set aside for the moment, it is further believed that in no part of the western front can a given amount of tonnage be so advantageously applied for the purposes of ending the war as in completing the necessary supplied and equipment for the Roumanian army. The personnel there is trained, ready and experienced in the present war; the officers and men have stood wall under most discouraging difficulties, and failure to help them now may easily result in the collapse of Roumania; the capture by the Germans of important localities and railroad connections in Southwestern Russia, and the giving of a great impetus to the movements toward a separate peace that are being pressed by certain elements in Russia. It is not seen how will be possible for Roumania to remain in the war throughout another winter without assured and material outside help; and if such help is to arrive in time to be of any use, it must be started without any further prolonged conferences or other delays.
F. Le J. Parker “
Sergiu Iosipescu, Septembre 2017
Le Front roumain en Septembre 1917
La dépêche télégraphique chiffrée du comte de Saint Aulaire, ministre de la République française en Roumanie, au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères à Paris, que nous présentons ici donne un aperçu sur la situation politique et militaire du royaume, réduit à la partie de la Moldavie libre et défendue, après l’effondrement de l’armée russe, seulement par les forces roumaines. Nous reproduisons le document d’après le volume des documents
La Roumanie dans la Grande Guerre. L’année 1917 en préparation à l’Institut d’Études politiques de Défense et d’Histoire militaire, par les soins de MM. le colonel Petre Otu, dr. Alexandru Madgearu et Mme. Cerasela Moldoveanu.
No. 503-504
Jassy, 10 septembre 1917
Mon télégramme no. 415 a résumé les renseignements que j’ai recueillis sur le projet austro-allemand de paix séparée et sans doute d’alliance avec la Roumanie. Il permet d’apprécier la part de vérité contenue dans les propos des agents autrichiens de La Haye. D’après ces renseignements, il s’agissait, en cas d’évacuation de la Moldavie par les Russes, de traiter non avec le Gouvernement roumain actuel, mais avec un nouveau Roi à proclamer sous les auspices de l’Allemagne avec le concours des hommes d’Etat roumains germanophiles de Bucarest. Quant au Roi Ferdinand et à M. Bratiano, ils ont le sentiment très net que l’ennemi ne consentirait pas à traiter avec eux, ou du moins les remplacerait après les avoir […]
[1]. Donc[…] Angoisses et peut-être des hésitations que la révolution russe justifie, leur décision de passer en Russie avec le Gouvernement et l’armée, en cas d’évacuation de la Moldavie, est inébranlable. Les préparatifs se poursuivent en vue de l’installation éventuelle du Gouvernement à Cherson ou Odessa. Le Maréchal du Palais se rend dans ces 2 villes pour aménager les immeubles affectés à la famille royale. J’ai déjà signalé le départ pour la Russie, par ordre du Gouvernement, des membres du Parlement. M. Bratiano que j’ai interrogé sur les propositions de paix faites à Berlin à M.M. Carp et Marghiloman m’a déclaré n’avoir aucune information précise à ce sujet. D’après un témoignage que je n’ai pu contrôler, il aurait cependant reçu récemment une lettre de M. Carp par l’entremise de son fils, ancien conseiller de la Légation de Roumanie à Vienne, actuellement à Jassy. Le plus probable est qu’il a cherché à se renseigner sur les pourparlers de Berlin, mais a préféré ne pas s’en ouvrir à moi. Cette curiosité et cette réserve n’enlèvent rien à la fermeté de résolution que d’ailleurs la force des choses lui impose.
Les assertions des agents autrichiens de La Haye sont complètement inexactes sur le seul point que je puisse vérifier avec certitude. M. Kerenski n’est jamais venu depuis que la débâcle russe a posé les questions de la paix séparée avec l’ennemi. Cette éventualité ne se réaliserait que si toute autre solution était impraticable, soit parce que la Russie conclurait elle-même une paix séparée, soit parce que le […] s’y aggraverait au point d’y rendre impossible le […] de l’Etat roumain en cas d’occupation de la Moldavie.
Actuellement la situation locale ne parait pouvoir être compromise que par de nouveaux désastres russes qui menaceraient d’isoler complètement la Moldavie. Sur ce front l’ennemi, désemparé par la résistance opiniâtre de l’armée roumaine, a cessé d’attaquer et pris des dispositions défensives en accumulant les réseaux de fil de fer et en creusant de nouvelles lignes de tranchées.
D’autre part, d’après des informations que V[otre] Exc[ellence] est sans doute à même de vérifier, M. Radoslavoff aurait déclaré récemment que la Bulgarie exige pour prix du maintien de son alliance avec les empires centraux la promesse de la Macédoine, de l’Oltenie et de la Dobroudja. Or, d’après les adversaires de MM. Carp et Marghiloman, ces dernières exigences sont inacceptables même pour ces derniers et excluraient donc tout espoir de paix séparée signée avec leur concours après l’exode en Russie du Gouvernement actuel.
Le coup médité par l’Allemagne contre la Roumanie étant, à la fois, grâce à l’armée roumaine, plus difficile et grâce aux appétits bulgares moins profitable qu’elle l’aurait pensé, on peut supposer qu’elle y a momentanément renoncé.
Mon collègue russe a reçu la réponse de Monsieur Terestchenko au télégramme identique des représentants de l’Entente sur les demandes de la Roumanie (voir mon télégramme 474). Il y manifeste quelque mauvaise humeur en présence de ce qu’il appelle l’immixtion de M. Bratiano dans les questions militaires. M. Poklewski évitera de faire part de ce sentiment au Président du Conseil. Ce dernier ne manquera pas de répondre qu’il s’est borné à demander la relève d’une partie des troupes russes par des unités serbes et tchèques, que cette mesure est également réclamée par tous les représentants de l’Entente, qui la considèrent comme la seule de nature à consolider le front russo-roumain et enfin qu’aucune initiative spéciale n’est nécessaire pour estimer que des troupes qui se battent sont préférables à des troupes qui souvent refusent de se battre et dévastent le pays.
Le projet de renforcement de l’armée roumaine par une armée serbo-tchèque, dont les éléments d’ailleurs inutilisés sont en Russie prend de plus en plus corps et apparaît ici comme le seul moyen sûr de […] la situation sur ce front, mais aussi de préparer pour le printemps prochain une vigoureuse offensive qui, combinée avec celle de l’armée de Macédoine, permettrait enfin de régler le compte des Bulgares et des Turcs. Quant à la demande d’affectation de la récolte de Bessarabie au ravitaillement de l’armée et de la population roumaines, […] se rattache à une organisation générale de ravitaillement qui n’est pas de sa compétence. D’autre part, le Général Korniloff a fait savoir qu’il a donné des ordres en vue de satisfaire à cette demande. Mais on craint ici que faute d’entente entre le pouvoir civil et le pouvoir militaire ces assurances restent sans effet.
Saint-Aulaire
(Arhivele Naționale Istorice Centrale, Microfilme Franța, inv. 1203, rola 90, dosar XIII, filele 27-29)
Sergiu Iosipescu, septembre 2017
[1] Mots manquants dans le déchiffrement.
O mărturie răzleață despre renașterea Armatei române și semnificația victoriei ei la Mărășești
Ofițer de marină educat în înaltele școli navale ale Franței, inginer specialist în electricitate, doctor în drept al Universității din Bruxelles, diplomat, înălțându-se pănă la funcția de ministru plenipotențiar al Regatului României la Stockholm, visiting professor în Statele Unite, matematician, poet și estetician, personaj desprins parcă din Renaștere, Matila Ghyka (
13 septembrie 1881 -
14 iulie 1965), strănepotul ultimului principe al Moldovei, a fost, deopotrivă, un erou al Războiului de Întregire a României.
Târziu, în exil, după cea de-a doua conflagrație mondială avea să-și scrie amintirile « într-o casă uriașă din secolul al XVII-lea, situată într-un parc, la câțiva kilometri de Dublin ; /…/ atmosfera din Insula Smaraldului e cea mai odihnitoare ce se poate închipui ; /…/ restul lumii nu există, ori foarte puțin ;... Evenimentele de care se ocupă lumea aici datează de două, patru sau opt secole ; /…/ Irlanda de azi, cu mireasma de secol XVIII ce plutește încă peste casele ei de țară, castele, ferme uriașe ori conace, ospitalitatea generoasă a locuitorilor ei, un anume dispreț pentru ordine și o privire prea pedantă a clipei și a exigențelor ei, îmi amintește de Moldova copilăriei mele ».
Între paginile reminiscențelor sale -
Couleur du monde. Escales de ma jeunesse -, apărute în 1956, câteva rânduri se remarcă prin acuitatea viziunii asupra renașterii militare românești din anul 1917 și a însemnătății victoriei de la Mărășești pentru ansamblul Frontului de Est.
„În timpul Primului Război Mondial am avut prilejul să constat extraordinara capacitate a țăranilor români, inteligența lor capabilă să-și însușească teoria pură, combinată în mod paradoxal cu intuiția , cu simțul mecanicii.
Misiunea franceză a generalului Berthelot în România, după dezastrul din toamna anului 1916, care a însemnat dizintegrarea armatelor ce începuseră războiul sub acțiunile combinate ale înfrângerilor și ale tifosului, și-a pus problema să refacă, în cel mai scurt timp posibil, o armată română capabilă să-i oprească pe nemți când primăvara ar fi îngăduit reluarea acțiunilor militare.
Elementele acestei reeducări erau tinerele contingente duse în Moldova în timpul retragerii, resturile armatei a cărei înfrângere provocase retragerea, ca și bolnavii recuperați din spitalele pline de răniți și de suferinzi de tifos exantematic.
Când a venit primăvara s-a produs miracolul: văzând defilarea noii armate la Iași, la 10 mai 1917, nu-mi puteam imagina că acești soldați semeți și surâzători, recent echipați din cap până în picioare, cu chipie la fel cu ale soldaților francezi, erau camarazii posomorâți care, cu două luni în urmă, rătăceau ca niște fantome pe străzile orașelor moldovene – ori erau aceleași fantome reîncarnate.
Două luni mai târziu, aceste trupe opreau la Mărășești ultima mare ofensivă germană pe Frontul oriental.
Miracolul se datora, în parte, devotamentului și strădaniilor ofițerilor misiunii Berthelot, dar, în mare parte, și strălucitului material uman, în care corpurile vânjoase ale țăranilor balcanici, sau mai curând carpatini se îngemănau cu inteligența vie – scînteierea latină în așteptare de nousprezece veacuri”
[1].
[1] Traducerea se datorează doamnei dr. Georgeta Filitti.